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To Be Of Service: The Lawyer's Aware Use Of The
Human Skills Associated With The Perceptive Self
Beryl Blaustone*
The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.
Justice Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the exclusion of several mental processes
and behaviors from conscious lawyering activity which are present in
the work of a lawyer. First, the current views on the scope of human
skills which are accepted as a legitimate part of professional behavior
are discussed. This acceptable view of lawyering behavior is labeled the
"doing of technical work to or for others." Certain intrapersonal and
interpersonal skills are identified as human skills which may be part of
any lawyering task. These human skills are characterized into two cate-
gories: the perceptive self and the knowing self. The reader will see
that lawyers have historically recognized the skills of lawyering which
are associated with the knowing self, but have failed to recognize the
significant skills associated with the perceptive self. The categories are
not formulated to indicate theoretical inclusion or exclusion. Instead,
the organization involves the identification of several functions which
lawyers-use and which are not generally viewed as seriously affecting
the quality of the lawyer's work.
An alternative model, is then presented for defining the scope of
observable behavior by the professional when lawyering: "working
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with others." The extent to which law practice requires the aware use
of the perceptive self and a broad range of human skills is then ex-
plored.2 The argument is made for the aware use of both the percep-
tive and the knowing selves in the practice of law. This argument is
based upon the premise that either proficient or incompetent practice
of certain overlooked human skills directly affects the quality of the at-
torney's performance in a variety of functions.3 Self-awareness in the
exercise of communication skills is advocated as a goal worthy of striv-
ing for because it leads to better lawyering, self-satisfaction, economy
of effort, and active respect for the autonomy of clients and others
with whom the lawyer works.4 "Working with others" evolved from
2. John Ayer advocates a similar philosophic perspective on the law which views
the law as the product of integrated human functioning. He presents a framework "for
understanding the law as an essentially human enterprise." Ayer, Isn't There Enough
Reality to Go Around, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 475, 476 (1978). Lynne Henderson also observes
that normal discourse in the law excludes a significant mode of understanding human
reality. She, like me, does not view legality and empathy as mutually exclusive realms.
Rather, she demonstrates how empathetic understanding contributes significant mean-
ing to our interpretation of the law. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1574 (1987). Julius Getman identifies several distinct voices which are used in legal edu-
cation and the law. Significantly, he laments the "undervaluing" of the "human voice"
in both legal education and scholarship. He then goes on to describe aspects of empa-
thy, understanding, and communication necessary for effective lawyering. He is describ-
ing some of the skills associated with the perceptive self. It is interesting that both he
and I use "voice" to explain our theories. Getman, Colloquy: Human Voice in Legal
Discourse, 66 TEX. L. REV. 557, 582, 583 (1988).
3. Some of these skills, such as the ability to use nonjudgmental listening and ex-
pressing skills, are acknowledged as part of the counseling function in lawyering. My
analysis demonstrates how these and other skills operate in a lawyering activity beyond
the counseling function. See Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7 (1965);
Watson, Professionalizing the Lawyer's Role as Counselor: Risk-taking for Rewards,
1989 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17-35.
4. There are legal authors who have each commented upon at least one of these
several aspects. See Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service in the
Agenda of Legal Education, 1990 AALS Mini-Workshop on Teaching the Law and Ethics
of Lawyering Throughout the Law Curriculum. See also G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE
LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977); W. LEHMAN,
HOW WE MAKE DECISIONS (Institute for Legal Studies Working Papers Series 1 No. 5,
Febuary 1986); Barkai, How to Develop the Skill of Active Listening, 30 PRAC. LAW 73
(June 1984); Barkai & Fine, Empathy Training for Lawyers and Law Students, 13 SW. UL.
REV. 505 (1983); Griswold, Law School and Human Relations, 37 CHI. B. REC. (1956); Leh-
man, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979); Lehman, Justice and
the War of Reasons, 1 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 127 (1988); Margulies, "Who are you to tell me
that?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Non-
[Vol. 15:241
To Be of Service
the realization that few lawyers are intrapersonally developed; that is,
few are self-aware of their own behavioral preferences, modes of
communication, values, and sense of self. Because rendering profes-
sional service occurs through the use of interpersonal skills, lawyers
must become aware of how they use the perceptive and knowing
selves professionally and how they are experienced by others. This in-
tegrated self-awareness in communication and problem solving skills is
not easy to achieve. Any change in self-concept, let alone professional
self-concept, is rarely viewed as effortless even when desirable. This
article demonstrates why such effort is worthwhile. The focus is on
these important issues because they have yet to become a part of the
lawyer's concept of professional activity for which the lawyer should
be held accountable.
The reader is then exposed to the core rationalizations which law-
yers employ to limit the attention paid to the human skills associated
with the perceptive self in lawyering. Through this exposure, he or she
may become more open to privately exploring his or her behavior
through examination of the reasons commonly used to justify the status
quo's limited perspective on what communication and behavior consti-
tutes conduct for which lawyers should be held accountable.
This writing, in large part, is a product of reflection on my experi-
ence in lawyering, teaching, mediating, and counseling.5 In addition,
there are significant bodies of literature which have assisted me in for-
clients, 68 N.C.L. REV. 213 (1990).
I draw significant support for my expanded view of professional role from the
works of J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (1984); and D.
SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983). Katz ex-
pounds upon the need for a trusting communication between doctor and patient as a
complex issue requiring rigorous study. Although his book touches upon several as-
pects of a reflective and client centered model, he stresses the need for the practi-
tioner to explore her interactions with patients. Schbn's work traces and examines the
development of professionalism. He explains the development of "rational technology"
as the prevalent model of professional role with the correlative public dissatisfaction
with professional service. In contrast, he posits a model of effective practice which also
requires conscious use of non-logical processes and acquiring knowledge through re-
flection in action.
5. For several years, I had a community-based law practice in Washington, D.C. In
addition, for almost a decade, I have mediated a variety of disputes and assisted indi-
vidual mediators and programs on a national basis. For nine years, I have taught advo-
cacy skills, non-advocacy skills and mediation skills to law students, lawyers and others.
I have also had extensive training and work experience in counseling. In 1989, I success-
fully completed training in the use and administration of the Myers-Briggs Type Indica-
tor (MBTI). I presently use this personal growth instrument in my teaching and training.
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mulating this theoretical framework for understanding the influence of
the existing range of mental processes and behavioral choices in law-
yers' interactions with themselves and with others.6 The commonality
of this literature is a major paradigm shift T from the view that learning
and human functioning occur within the separate traditional behavior
modes suggested in the dichotomies of: empathy versus intellect, will
versus reason, cognitive versus affective, perception versus analysis, ra-
tional versus irrational.8 This literature is significant to lawyering because
it demonstrates that the "rational functions" of lawyering tasks are not
accomplished independently from the other methods by which humans
assimilate, synthesize, and choose their interactions with external and
internal conditions.9 Extending existing theory, I designed the constructs
6. This literature comes from different sources including sociology of the legal pro-
fession; the role of the professional in other occupations; legal ethics and professional
responsibility and the role of the lawyer; clinical legal education theory; alternative dis-
pute resolution theory; mediation theory; communications theory; psychology and
brain research; feminist theory; and education or learning theory. It is beyond the
scope of the present article to examine the process of synthesis from all these fields of
theory which span several years of study. The contributions from all these areas, how-
ever, should be examined separately and may appear later as another article or book.
Nevertheless, many of the footnotes to follow will introduce some of this literature to
the reader primarily in the areas of psychology, education, urban planning, in addition
to several pieces of legal scholarship.
7. "A new paradigm is established as a result of many small decisions and choices
and only much later does anyone make the discovery that lo! we have a new para-
digm." Hills, What is a Paradigm Shift?, 15 WORLD FUTURE SOC'Y. BULL., 1, 1 (March -April
1981). As a profession incorporates a new paradigm, it must overcome resistance
presented by the old ways of thinking particular to that profession. See T. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
8. In C. HARRISON & J. RIFKEN, THE GENDER ORGANIZATION OF MEDIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE FEMINIZATION OF LEGAL PRACTICE (Institute for Legal Studies Working Papers Series 4 No.
2 February 1989), the authors comprehensively state a series of dualisms in legal theory.
Further, they discuss the gender-based hierarchy which privileges the masculine traits in
these dualisms. See also Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKLEY WOMEN'S L.). 39 (198.5). For a thorough discussion
of the development of the split between reason and emotion, and its enshrinement in
the legal system, see Henderson, The Dialogue of Heart and Head, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
123 (1988). See also Henderson, supra note 2.
The Shaffers have also noted how the practice of Rispetto allows lawyers to keep
their dignity and sense of self. The exercise of Rispetto operates as a construct for
analysis which excludes polar dichotomies. Shaffer & Shaffer, Character and Commu-
nity: Rispetto as Virtue in the Tradition of Italian-American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 838 (1989).
9. Ayer argues for a broader framework for understanding doctrine or law. Ayer,
supra note 2. I argue for a broader understanding of the practice of law. John Mudd
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for determining the human skills used in lawyering which are associated
with the perceptive self and the knowing self.
II. EBENEZER LEGAL: A TALE OF LAWYERING PAST AND FUTURE
The reader is invited to read a script of fictional dialogue which
introduces all of the key concepts in this article. I ask the reader to
enjoy herself as she reads this script. After this odyssey, the reader
should be well equipped to explore the theory in the remainder of this
article. 10
A. Introduction By the Characters or Voices
EBENEZER LEGAL: I am the voice of the author and projected reader, the
complex human being functioning as a hardworking, well intentioned,
somewhat reflective, basically competent attorney. I am conditioned in
the traditional perspective of lawyering which is the "doing of technical
work to or for others." I am the client's champion and an officer of the
court. I am the leading actor, if you will. I do not handle people as
though law practice were a "helping profession," which is what
"Working With Others" idealistically believes should be my role. The
Code of Professional Ethics does not require me to define my role this
way, and in fact at times prohibits it.i I may interact with people but I
discusses the inadequacy of the emphasis on the "rational dimension" in lawyering. In
addition, he sets forth a broader perspective of lawyer performance and education.
See Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performance - Referenced Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 189 (1986). Brennan's thesis on this question is that the "internal dialogue of rea-
son and passion" is central to the vitality of the judicial process. Brennan, Reason, Pas-
sion, and "The Process of the Law'" 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 3 (1988). See also Hender-
son, supra note 2.
10. My decision to incorporate a fictional dialogue as a means of introducing my
theory is an outgrowth both of my study of learning theory and my individual propen-
sity to demonstrate ideas by creating exercises, role-plays, simulations, and story-telling.
The use of this dialogue is intended to ease the overall general framework into the
reader's mind. Thereafter, the regular discourse of the piece should permit easier inte-
gration and critique by the reader. In the subsequent sections reference is made to the
illustrations within the dialogue for examples. For an introduction to this learning theory,
see P. KLINE. THE EVERYDAY GENIUS: RESTORING CHILDREN'S NATURAL JOY OF LEARNING - AND YOURS
Too (1988); J. QUINA, EFFECTIVE SECONDARY TEACHING: GOING BEYOND THE BELL CURVE (1989); C.
ROSE, ACCELERATED LEARNING (1985).
11. It has been the subject of comment elsewhere that the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility neglects the counseling function. See Redmount, Client Counseling
and the Regulation of Professional Conduct, 26 ST. LOUIS UL.). 629 (1982). Cannons 5, 6,
and 7 can be interpreted to prevent the type of attention I suggest. See MODEL CODE OF
1990]
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do so only as a secondary matter for the instrumental purposes of
making the law work for my clients. Beware, some of the other charac-
ters in this discussion are into pop psychology!12 I am sure that you, the
reader, will end up agreeing with me that much of what they regard as
a significant part of lawyering is not central to my role as it has been
defined by our society.
PERCEPTIVE SELF: I am the voice for the abilities to use different nonjudg-
mental listening and expressing skills, the ability to monitor internal bias,
abilities in the attending skills focused on the accurate understanding of
the other, 13 the ability to see patterns from analogy and from shifts in
examining particularities to examining generalities. I am always part of
why Ebenezer succeeds and why he fails. He could increase his odds of
success if he simply acknowledged my presence, understood my func-
tions, and paid attention to, what I do when he works. Instead, he regu-
larly calls upon his loyal servant, "Core Rationalizations," to blind him to
my presence. Pity, since I will continue to be involved in his work. It is
about time Ebenezer paid some attention to me. If he did, he would
know how and when I can be useful. I want Ebenezer to look to the
advantages of my presence and consciously cultivate my participation.
I also assist Ebenezer by contributing intuitive understanding to his
work. He never appreciates that he is referring to me every time he
declares: "I have a hunch!" The truth of the matter is that often he
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY (1981).
12. Pop psychology is a derogatory term used to identify lay psychobabble. It is
often used as well to discredit meaningful discussions about human behavior and
motivation.
13. Duncan Kennedy acknowledged the importance of self-knowlege regarding
one's effects on others. As a victimized law student, he lamented the absence of self
awareness in the execution of the professional role of the law professor. At that time,
he stressed that awareness of one's conduct on others should be considered as part of
one's professional role. See Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV.
LAW SOC. AC. 71 (1970).
Philosophically, Ebenezer's use of the perceptive self is intended to create the dia-
logical relationship and the virtuous friendship characterized by trust and safety. Aris-
totle regarded this level of human interaction as the highest form of friendship where
one attends to the other, experiences the state of the other, and does the foregoing
because this experience is good. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1164al - 1172a 15.
Martin Buber, mid-twentieth century philosopher, examined how achieving understand-
ing of the other to that person's satisfaction is the centerpiece in the construction of
the dialogical relationship. Buber explores the value of such dialogical relations for self,
the other, and community. See M. BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN (1969); M. BUBER, I AND
THOU (1958).
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overlooks his hunches and the experiential bases which validate them.
KNOWING SELF: I am the voice for the abilities to clinically evaluate both
behavioral and substantive choices by applying norms and standards to
specific current actions. I include the ability to uncover and test one's
own assumptions and conclusions concurrently with one's execution of
legal functions. I use these abilities in planning and modifying fact inves-
tigation such as the ability to critically evaluate the worth of evidence.
Principally, I am the abilities in inductive and deductive reasoning. I have
the reputation of being solely responsible for Ebenezer's analytic rigor
in using the law to solve problems.
HUMAN SKILLS: I am the voice for the entire inventory of intrapersonal
and interpersonal skills utilized by Ebenezer in lawyering activity. From
this universe, perceptive self and knowing self evolved into distinct cat-
egories of human skills utilized by any lawyer. These categories are for
the convenience of understanding the theory. Therefore, I am the com-
plete range of mental processes and behaviors which resides within any
lawyer. In the real world, I am not neatly divided into perceptive and
knowing parts of the self. Rather, several different skills may be partici-
pating together in the accomplishment of goals or tasks.
WORKING WITH OTHERS: I am the voice of Lawyering Future. I do not ele-
vate the role of lawyer above that of client or involved others. Instead,
I see the lawyer as an equal human being whose quality of thought and
behavior is not solely evaluated by the technical correctness of a legal
answer. Much of what Ebenezer does as a lawyer extends beyond his
limited self-concept as a rational technician. 14 Understanding the law
requires more than the use of rational analysis. Rather, much of what
Ebenezer does involves working with others, and working with others
involves a number of mental and behavioral processes. Yet, Ebenezer
goes about the work unaware of the many things he does which affect
the quality of what he does. 15 In these aspects, I better let "Perceptive
14. See supra notes 4 & 9; see also T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING (1987), which also addresses the moral and ethical dimensions of a broader
perspective on lawyering.
15. See Lehman, In Pursuit of a Client's Interest, supra note 4, which cuts to the
core of the matter: Self awareness about the perceptual differences between lawyer
and client and about the influence of the lawyer's values on the client is needed by the
lawyer. My additional concerns go beyond the interviewing and counseling relationship,
as such, to what we do not see in the full representation of a matter. From a philo-
sophic perspective, Lehman discusses the existence of the "arbiter" in the lawyer which
embodies the use of the full self in decision making in lawyering. See W. LEHMAN, How
1990]
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Self" and "Human Skills" speak for themselves. Speaking for myself, I
think Ebenezer should regard his professional role as encompassing my
concerns. He might become more efficient and satisfied if he could ap-
preciate that when working, he relies on many people to assist him: the
client; his colleagues; employees; adversaries; civil servants; and deci-
sion makers.
Further, I see the need for meshing human interaction with legal
tasks. In this context, I view Ebenezer as having responsibility for pro-
moting understanding in communication and for appreciating how his
behavior affects the choices of the client and the outcomes of discrete
lawyering tasks.
CORE RATIONALIZATIONS: I am the voice for existing rationales which em-
body important values and perspectives governing the development of
the profession. Core rationalizations is the body of thought which
forms the framework for Ebenezer's traditional view of lawyering as
the "doing of technical work to or for others." My thoughts have been
around for a very long time. The legal system is quite accustomed to
coming to me to provide unquestionable authority for acceptable posi-
tions. For the record, I am present in this discussion in order to assist
Ebenezer on any issue where he needs me. Ebenezer should feel free
to scan my collection, or if he wishes, I can suggest which selections
might be more appropriate for the occasion.
B. The Scene
SETTING: All voices are assembled with Ebenezer in his law firm's confer-
ence room. Reluctantly, he has called this meeting to discuss his han-
dling of a particular case. He thinks that perhaps these rowdy and rau-
cous characters can help him unravel what happened in that case. In
other words, Ebenezer is about to reflect on his ideas about what a
lawyer is.
EBENEZER: As you all know, I am under pressure of deadlines in the mat-
ter of Clark v. Smith. I propose to discuss my handling of this one case
with you. You are all admonished not to disclose the contents of this
conversation with anyone else. Let me then begin by providing some
background on this case.
WORKING WITH OTHERS: Good! Do fill us in not only on the legal status of
this matter, but include as well questions arising from the interactions in
WE MAKE DECISIONS, supra note 4.
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this case. I am pleased that you are trying to integrate us all into a
framework which makes sense. Previously, you have overlooked the
fact that we interact with each other all of the time. Therefore, your
attitudes towards any one of us has affected us all. We hope this dis-
cussion helps you to make use of us in your work in a more cooopera-
tive and efficient manner.
KNOWING SELF: Yes, we need to be filled in so that we can analyze the
issues properly. Of course, I am interested in the concrete intellectual
analysis of the case. However, I provide better analysis when I am in-
formed of the actual perceptions and desires about which "Perceptive
Self" has accurate knowledge. In addition, hopefully you will begin to
see that I perform many functions, only some of which you now habit-
ually use while overlooking my other processes.
PERCEPTIVE SELF: Yes, we need this information to understand the context
within which you have identified issues because we can then determine
whether our focus should be changed and our issues modified or de-
veloped. Your exclusion of me in the past has made me angry. Ebene-
zer, I was gratified to receive your invitation to attend this meeting. I
am also sincerely interested in hearing why you have valued "Knowing
Self" so much more than me?
HUMAN SKILLS: Yes, let's look at the matter for both the narrow and the
broader concerns and for where we all fit in realizing our goals. We
need to ponder the benefits of what each of us will say today. Ebene-
zer, you are going to experience now how both "Knowing Self" and
"Perceptive Self" need each other when working with you in order to
give competent legal service. Even for those tasks which you identify as
solely containing functions of "Knowing Self," if we break down all the
incremental steps of that task, we would probably find functions of
"Perceptive Self" also present.
CORE RATIONALIZATIONS: Ebenezer, let me warn you. What you have be-
gun to hear has little to do with how you generally perceive yourself.
May I suggest that you set a time limit for your discussion with these
voices. If you let them, they will take up too much of your valuable
attention. You know how distracting some of them have been all
along.
EBENEZER: Thank you, Core Rationalizations. I am watching the clock on
this discussion! Mr. Smith is my client. He is the owner of a taxicab
company. I want to set aside matters of proper incorporation and the
functioning of his business as a partnership as these matters are not
1990]
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what are troubling me presently. Mr. Smith and his company are being
sued in a negligence action involving one of his taxis in an accident.'8
This action is brought by Terry Clark, a law student, who sustained
injuries while riding in a Smith taxi which ran a red light at an intersec-
tion. We have just about completed discovery. The plaintiff has also
alleged ultra vires activity on the part of the corporation and is seeking
to pierce the corporate veil of Smith Transportation Company. We
have a trial date set for six weeks from now. As you might know, we
are in a comparative negligence jurisdiction.
Negotiations have gone well and I expect a favorable settlement.
My current settlement offer is pending while at the same time I face a
deadline for filing my Motion for Summary Judgment. I have not started
drafting the Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Although this case
is ripe for settlement, I believe my Motion has merit and I am going
ahead with its preparation. This motion should make my settlement of-
fer more attractive.
All in all, I thought the case was progressing nicely. Given my cli-
ent's situation, he can easily handle the terms of the settlement and the
business would continue to be in a relatively healthy state. However, all
of a sudden, a new set of issues have emerged in this litigation that
have side-tracked my client and put the functioning of the corporation
at risk.
Troubles began early in the discovery period. Plaintiff deposed
both my client, Mr. Smith, in his capacity as president of Smith Trans-
portation Company, and Smith's comptroller, Mr. Lee Harris. Harris has
been Smith's comptroller for eighteen years. Harris did a good job in
preparing for and in doing the deposition With me. Smith was in attend-
ance at this deposition. Both men have been close associates and Smith
relied upon Harris as his right-hand in managing much of the work. This
is now all changed since the Harris deposition.
Frankly, I will tell you that although I thought this matter was not
my concern as Smith's lawyer, I have begun to rethink this position. I
now face a situation where, in part because of this litigation, my client's
company is falling apart. Our legal defense is still quite necessary. How-
ever, we now face a dysfunctional work relationship which is affecting
my client's business as well as his capacity to engage in this litigation.
Let me give you one example of what is going on. Recently Smith de-
cided to create a new position of manager in order to free himself for
other activities. My client did not select Harris as the manager of the
16. Smith Transportation Corporation is self-insured.
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place. In the past it was understood between these two men that Har-
ris would be responsible for managing any company business that
Smith did not. Harris recently consulted an attorney and is now con-
templating suing Smith on some sort of breach of contract theory.
PERCEPTIVE SELF: I can tell that certain aspects of this case, which do not
address directly the legal merits of our defense, are influencing signifi-
cantly the client's welfare. We should examine your choices here and
see if there is an effective role for you to play in these matters which
can help you handle the Clark case.
EBENEZER: Okay. First of all, Mr. Smith has strong ideas about how discov-
ery should have proceeded in the Clark litigation which do not com-
port with mine. I am the expert here and Mr. Smith should trust my
judgment. He does not fully understand our defense objectives in a
deposition. In response to opposing counsel's questions, Harris re-
sponded "yes" or "no" without much elaboration. He followed my
instructions and did not volunteer any information. As a result, Mr.
Smith is upset with what he calls "give aways" in the deposition. He felt
that Harris should have "stood up" for Smith more. Actually, in my
view, Harris was appropriately conservative in the deposition. Since
then, the relationship between the two men has seriously deteriorated.
At the time, I basically ignored most of Smith's comments. I simply
stated that the Harris deposition essentially went well according to my
plan.
I remember the preparation of the Harris deposition very well.
Harris had never been involved in any serious litigation before. This was
his first deposition. I, of course, took the extra time to explain the pro-
cess and attend to Harris's apprehensions. Clearly, Harris took the dep-
osition seriously. His preparation for our meetings was impeccable. Har-
ris stated that he was deeply committed to Smith and wanted to do the
best he could for him.
PERCEPTIVE SELF: You construed Smith's concerns as questioning your han-
dling of the deposition and not as an issue likely to affect Smith's be-
havior toward Harris. I noticed you did not explore with Smith his con-
cern about Harris's performance. Similarly, you did not disclose to Smith
the extent to which Harris prepared in order to perform well, nor his
thorough commitment to Smith. I wonder why?
EBENEZER: Look at how pressured I am. Besides, it's off the point! The
deposition went well and I told Smith so! To be truthful, I do not even
know how to have the type of conversation you suggest.
1990]
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CORE RATIONALIZATIONS: Exactly my point! Let me add, what Smith wants
is for Ebenezer simply to get the Clark matter handled. Smith did not
and does not look to Ebenezer as someone who should become in-
volved in the personnel matters of the office.
KNOWING SELF: I am not sure that I agree. After all, it appears by not
doing so, by omission, Ebenezer is now faced with being involved in
those exact same issues, albeit now at an exaggerated and more defen-
sive posture than he might have been earlier. In addition, Ebenezer,
you are now facing trial and you may have real difficulties with your
witnesses. Thus, your reliance on "Core Rationalizations" is contributing
to the difficulty with Smith. Instead you should address and perhaps
resolve issues of importance to the client which impinge upon his sub-
sequent actions. I believe that when Smith expressed his dissatisfaction
about Harris, Ebenezer knew that the client's perceptions of the depo-
sition might influence Smith's behavior towards Harris, making Harris a
far more reluctant witness at trial. Thus, Smith's reactions have reper-
cussions in this case and beyond this case. Ebenezer, you just as much
said so a few minutes ago!
PERCEPTIVE SELF: Ebenezer, I was aware of the possibility of Smith's con-
cerns. After all, he expressed them forthrightly. They just did not fit into
the picture of what you felt you had to address. I can appreciate that.
After all, you are concerned about how little time you have to give to
Smith as well as your other clients. I want the same thing! That's why I
said, although you would not hear me, that we should discuss Smith's
concerns and explore his assumptions about Harris since they affect the
principal relationship upon which the Smith Transportation Company is
built. I felt at this time that although you and Smith were talking to one
another that no real communication was taking place. That is, Smith
was unable to listen to you because he was too concerned about his
own expectations of the matter and you could not really understand
Smith at the time, because of your impulse to view such matters as
extraneous to your representation. Rather, some discussion may have
altered Smith's perceptions, as well as given you feedback on the dep-
osition which may or may not have been useful to you.
EBENEZER: Your awareness may be all well and good, but just what con-
cretely do you suggest might have been more appropriate choices for
me to make? Show me that it is worthwhile for me to make such
choices.
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PERCEPTIVE SELF: Valid question! 17 First, choose to simply pause and play
back the matter. It is not all that time-consuming! Rather, this type of
listening is difficult because we do not yet know how to listen and
comprehend well, although we believe we do.18 Simply pause and re-
state what you are hearing to the satisfaction of your client. Your client
will then take the next steps. In doing this, you permit yourself to focus
on satisfying the other person that you have understood the person's
intent as well as their unspoken concerns. When doing this, you may
experience a change in your original comprehension of what was said.
HUMAN SKILLS: You are right "Perceptive Self", but this is easier said than
done. Ebenezer, I think it is helpful to focus on a number of distinct
skills which allow you to identify when certain types of interactions or
interventions are appropriate. For instance, this is a complex situation
involving your ability to accurately understand Smith from his perspec-
tive, your self-awareness of your internal bias and reactions, and your
ability to withhold judgment when you are listening, perceiving, and
talking to Smith. To some extent, all of these skills are implicated in your
ability to communicate as "Perceptive Self" recommends. If we plan
now to pay attention in the future to how you can actually practice
these skills, you should find it easier to interact in this manner at appro-
priate times.
WORKING WITH OTHERS: The concern I hear voiced today is that you
make the work more difficult, you sometimes thwart your desired re-
sults, and perhaps alienate others by not paying attention to this inter-
action within you. 19 May I add another point here? These skills identi-
17. In one sense, I am critical of "Perceptive Self's" acceptance of Ebenezer's re-
mark as a "valid question." It is too common and too easy for a critic to assert that
alternatives must be fully articulated before considering a different perspective. Rather,
Ebenezer should explore a different perspective because of its potential to alter his
perceptions. His request for solutions should not be used as a switch to turn off his
reflection on the issues. At this moment in the dialogue, Ebenezer gives an overpower-
ing response which, in the sense I have just described, is an invalid question. Neverthe-
less, "Perceptive Self" responds in order to engage Ebenezer further in reflection and
to challenge the sufficiency of Ebenezer's point. In actuality, perhaps "Knowing Self"
would be more suited to give such a response to Ebenezer.
18. Carl Rogers made this point in discussing the road blocks experienced by most
people (including professionals) to good communication. See C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A
PERSON ch. 3 (1961).
19. Martha Minow, in Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47
(1988), begins her discussion by acknowledging the common practice among us of
adopting "unstated reference points that hide from view a preferred position and
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fied by "Perceptive Self" will in actuality enable you to give some
control of the discussion to your client.20 If you do give some direction
back to the client, you may well be rewarded with some new informa-
tion. In this matter, for instance, not only might you hear more about
how Smith relates to Harris, but also Smith might shed some light on
the extent to which he, rather than Harris, controls the books for the
corporations.
KNOWING-SELF: Agreed! This might have given you more data on the
functioning of his company, which goes to the heart of your legal argu-
ment against piercing the corporate veil for liability. This information
may have led to earlier preparation of your memo. I raise this point
even though you started this discussion saying that these matters were
not part of today's discussion. I think we all agree, however, that these
matters must be addressed in your Motion and Memorandum of Points
and Authorities. Furthermore, they will influence your settlement
discussions.
PERCEPTIVE SELF: You are quite capable of hearing the observations of
both "Knowing Self" and me while engaged in this matter. You often
reflect in the moment of lawyering. You simply need to acknowledge
this fact and expand your hearing to a broader range of points. This
takes practice, just as learning how to reflect in the first place took
practice.2 1
shield it from challenge by other plausible alternatives." Id. at 48. She discusses the
barriers we theoretically and behaviorally construct to block other versions of truth in
our interactions. See also supra notes 4, 9, 13 & 15.
20. The model of client centered lawyering incorporates this goal. See G. BELLOW &
B. MOULTON, supra note 4; D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1977);
T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING (1976); T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW
STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE (1977); T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
(1980); Sacks, Human Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers, 11 J. LEGAL. EDUC
316 (1959); Kelso & Kelso, Conflict, Emotion, and Legal Ethics, 10 PAC.L.i. 69 (1978);
Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL
PROF. 97 (1985). The skills focused models give partial guidance to the specific skills
which enable the attorney to achieve client centered lawyering. See Cort & Sammons,
The Search for "Good Lawyering": A Concept and Model of Lawyering Competencies,
29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 397 (1980); Holmes, Educating for Competent Lawyering - Case
Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 535 (1976); Smith & Nester, Lawyers,
Clients, and Communication Skill, 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 275; Strong, The Pedagogical Impli-
cations of Inventorying Legal Capacities, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 555 (1951).
21. See Smith & Nester, supra note 20. See also Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's
Interest, supra note 4; Himmelstein & Lesnick, Unpublished Essay (1981) (on file with the
author), which explores the necessity for taking personal responsibility for our behavior
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From reflection, such as we are doing now, you will be more able
to identify the specific types of skills, about which "Human Skills"
spoke, that are in need of your conscious attention. For instance, Ebe-
nezer, you could have asked Smith some questions about his percep-
tions. This would have permitted you to educate your client on matters
that perplexed him. It is not decisive here that you thought you were
understood. Let's take the deposition. You could have simply re-
quested, "Please tell me more about your reactions to the deposition."
You could follow up with more specific inquiries such as: "Are you
thinking that in this deposition it was most important'for Harris to make
statements that explicitly spoke about your intentions?" Then you
could clarify the matter for Mr. Smith, such as: "Let me clarify our pur-
poses in the Harris deposition." Then you would explain what those
purposes were. After your explanation, you might ask, "In light of the
purposes I've just explained, what are your thoughts now?" Also, you
could inform Smith of Harris's intent. "Are you aware that Harris
wanted to do well for you?" You can go on to relate Mr. Harris's spe-
cific comments. Further, you can explain why you think Harris did a
good job for Smith. You should take responsibility for how you
coached Harris, and let Smith argue with you about the decisions that
were made rather than letting Smith transfer that hostility onto Harris.
CORE RATIONALIZATIONS: This is going too far! I must be heard! Ebenezer, I
can't believe you are paying so much attention to these voices of dis-
traction. Your rational skill and effective partisanship must come first at
all costs. Should you divert your energies into these collateral concerns,
you risk impairing your ability to act as a detached objective lawyer in
all circumstances.
EBENEZER: Wait a minute, "Core Rationalizations," I have learned some-
thing here which may help me in my work with Smith. I am no longer
convinced that some attention to these matters will lessen my ability to
advocate well. What these voices are saying to me is that if I asked
these questions and took time for this level of interaction, I might have
in lawyering. Himmelstein & Lesnick put human relationships at the core rather than the
periphery of lawyering. They argue for a new framework which broadens lawyering to
include the practice of care, compassion, and responsiveness. Their entire discourse is
premised on persuading the practitioner to be more reflective in practice. See also
Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering as Portrayed in the
Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1990). For
a fuller discussion of the role of reflection in professional work, see D. SCHON, supra
note 4.
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alleviated a lot of Smith's concerns which contribute to his present un-
cooperative state of mind and to the unstable condition of his com-
pany's affairs.
C. The Doing of Technical Work To or For Others
The dominant culture of professional conduct in lawyering is the
doing of technical work to or for others in opposition to other people.
In other words, our work exists within a legal culture which posits legal
work as a technical service done within an adversary process.22 When
the attorney is working as a member of a team, co-counsel or client
advisor, he or she is not necessarily working within a collaborative or
cooperative framework. Although these different formats of legal work
exist, they exist within the overriding epistemology of legal work which
sets up the construct of legal work as the doing of technical work to or
for others. Thus, the -attorney may not perceive the adversarial per-
22. For an illustration of this view, see Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1951). See also T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra note 14; Redmount, supra note 11
(discussion on the different models of the attorney-client relationship, noting the preva-
lence of this view).
Stephen Ellmann places client decision making at the center of the relationship. He
recognizes the reality that many "lawyers may never listen to their client's well enough
to understand their actual needs and concerns." Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 717, 720 (1987). However, he thereupon argues that the nonjudgmental active
listening methodology is a psychologically manipulative tool which may inhibit the cli-
ent's genuine exercise of power to make the decisions in her case. He argues that this
manipulation may be exploitative rather than benign. This argument is made in support
of client autonomy and in recognition of the effects of social status and economic class.
Nevertheless, Ellmann's concerns support a technocratic view of a lawyer's work which
excludes the challenge to explore openly such manipulation with the client. Both he and
I view manipulation as universally present in all human interaction regardless of the
presence or absence of skill. Of course, exploitative manipulation can occur through
ignorance, disregard, and lack of reflection. I view the issue as whether the participants
acknowledge and examine the consequences of their particular form of communica-
tion. Lawyer-client communications which exclude attention to active listening and em-
pathy may nevertheless be injuriously manipulative. Furthermore, the experience of ma-
nipulation may be more oppressive because the power imbalance is not addressed and
the communication is far more directive. It is also important to separate the issues of
nonjudgmental empathetic understanding from neutrality regarding moral choice. In my
view, the attorney should be both an attentive listener as well as one who helps the
client question her moral choices. Although Ellman gives an example of where a moral
need was translated into a psychological need, both needs can be addressed. Id. at
749. These are simply two functions that attorneys should provide. What is significant
here is the lawyer's exercise or lack of skill, and the lawyer's acceptance or rejection of
both listening and challenging in effective ways.
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spective she brings into her collaborative and cooperative relations
with others.23
Within this dominant legal culture, the attorney bases her interac-
tions on being the possessor of technical knowledge or being per-
ceived as the possessor of technical knowledge. While it is certainly
true that the attorney possesses technical knowledge, it is also true that
the attorney may excessively rely on this fact in constructing a profes-
sional vision of what constitutes appropriate attitudes, communications,
and behaviors. The vision of the lawyer as an objective, detached prac-
titioner of specialized knowledge has permitted us'to remain non-self-
aware communicators. This fact continues to distance the practioner
from self, client, and others.
As lawyers we are trained to be rule bound. After all, lawyers
often apply rules in problem-solving. In order to isolate the rules for
application, lawyers look backward in history to find precedent. Law-
yers freeze present facts in order to compare them with the facts in
precedential cases for purposes of application and distinction in pend-
ing cases. In other words, every problem becomes a static set of facts
to be applied to a legal rule or compared to an earlier problem defined
in terms of its relationship to a legal rule. Even where new facts come
to light distinguishing a present matter from existing doctrine, the pre-
sent facts are still parsed from surrounding reality and become static in
order to permit analysis.24 In all likelihood, in the matter of Clark v.
Smith, the matters that attracted our legal attention are comparative
negligence and the safeguarding of the corporate entity. Thus, both the
23. See D. SCHON, supra note 4, for a historical development of professionalism
which tracks this analysis and includes the legal profession. See also Riskin, Mediation
and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982), for a discussion of what he labels the "lawyer's
standard philosophical map". For a description of the history of lawyering as a profes-
sion, see Abel, The Transformation of the American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 7 (1986).
Robert Burt asserts that mistrust is prevalent in the attorney-client relationship. This
mistrust affects the quality of attorney-client communications. Burt states that
attorneys see, and only want to see, their own good intentions toward the
client and fail to notice the suspicion engendered by their unwelcome
prognosis and advice. Thus, mistrust that influences the entire course of
the relation between attorney and the client can arise though neither is
prepared to acknowledge this fact to the other.
Burt, Conflict and Trust between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1020 (1981).
24. For instance, the excellent instruction in developing the facts and building the
theory of a case in D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF
(1984) demonstrates how it is necessary to do exactly this in order to craft good case
planning and argumentation.
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rules and the reality of the facts are controlled by the lawyer, within
limits, but nonetheless controlled.
As lawyers we are trained to view matters instinctively as involving
dichotomous positions.25 That is, we view matters as right or wrong,
relevant or irrelevant, rational or irrational, meritorious or frivolous.
Given particular legal tasks, such findings may have merit and may be
desirable. However, we often instinctively think-and behave in this po-
sitional mode even when it is not beneficial. This mode prevents us
from seeing different perspectives or options which would help solve
the matter.26 Our legal culture conditions us to believe that legal analy-
25. See supra note 8. See also Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education,
79 YALE L. J. 444 (1970) (author addresses the existence and consequences of such dual-
isms in legal education and lawyering and specifically laments the consequence of di-
vorcing intellect from creativity in the training of legal thought); Parker, A Review of
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance with Some Remarks on the Teaching of
Law, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 318 (1976) (the author discusses the effects of dualisms in main-
taining an incomplete understanding of reality by separating subjective and objective
reality).
26. As discussed later in this article, there are additional modes of perception
which can enhance the lawyer's understanding of a matter. One of my premises is that
in waking activity we utilize several different modes of perception. Of course we use
them in varying degrees in varying tasks. We also use them differently as individuals.
However, we do utilize distinct skills in learning and in extending that learning to the
external world. Learning theory supports my premise. Learning theory is found both in
the literature of psychology and education.
Learning theory is focused on heightened retention, recall and performance by the
activation of all the mental processes in doing a particular assignment or learning unit.
The associated literature includes both theory building and quantitative studies. Dr. Ge-
orgi Losanov is well known in Bulgaria, in fact recognized by the United Nations, for
enhancing the learning potential of students through a method built upon current un-
derstandings of the brain and mind. His theory is essentially to recreate the conditions
for the ease of learning associated with the fir.t years of life when there is little con-
straint or learning blocks impeding the functioning of both the brain and the mind in the
normal child. The recreation of such conditions is by means of promoting curiosity and
the overlay of several differnt modes of stimulation in understanding any matter. G.
Lozanov, Suggestology and Outlines of Suggestopedy (1978).
In the United States, there are several scholars engaged in using, extending and
amending the basic theory of an integrated use of the self in the learning process.
Among these individuals are: Dr. Peter Kline, author of EVERYDAY GENIUS: RESTORING CHIL-
DREN'S NATURAL JOY OF LEARNING - AND YOURS Too, supra note 10; Dr. James Quina,
author of EFFECTIVE SECONDARY TEACHING: GOING BEYOND THE BELL CURVE, supra note 10; and
Dr. Ivan Barzakov from the Barzak Educational Institute. The reader may be familiar
with the ample popular literature applying this theory to such specific tasks as writing
and drawing. Examples of this development are G. RICO, WRITING THE NATURAL WAY: USING
RIGHT-BRAIN TECHNIQUES TO RELEASE YOUR EXPRESSIVE POW RS (1983) and B. EDWARDS, DRAWING
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sis is adequate where positions are contrasted and ambiguity contained.
After identifying legal issues, the lawyer's task becomes the replace-
ment of ambiguity with specific meaning. Therefore, we tend to re-
spond automatically to the inherent conflict or the dispute in the case
by developing the differences and opposing interests.27 Thus, our com-
munications and behavior are affected by our profession's orientation
towards conflict and ambiguity.
Although we may often engage in various formats in legal work
where we see ourselves actively cooperating or collaborating with
others, we, nevertheless, operate within our overriding legal perspec-
tive of the attorney functioning with an individualistic non-self-aware
style towards tasks and responsibilities.28 This approach to work is due
in part to the tension between regularly working in disputes within the
adversarial legal process and being prone to reduce ambiguity in legal
work. A significant result of this orientation is the need among lawyers
to achieve control in conflict, i.e., control over the client, control of the
work place and translation of competitive behavior into presumptively
successful professional behavior.29
Ill. HUMAN SKILLS: THE PERCEPTIVE SELF AND THE KNOWING SELF EXPLAINED
The label "the perceptive self" is representative of the number of
distinct skills or mental processes which an individual uses in order to
function effectively in daily interaction and problem-solving, but which
are rarely consciously attended to in the performance of lawyering
tasks.30 These distinct skills permit an individual to perceive internal ex-
ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BRAIN (1979). See also G. Strong, The Lawyer's Left Hand (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author) (discusses "right-brain lawyering").
27. See Curtis, supra note 22 (illustration of this perspective).
28. See Lesnick, supra note 21.
29. Farrell, The Masculine Value System: Men Defining Reality, in ISSUES IN FEMINISM:
A FIRST COURSE IN WOMEN'S STUDIES 56 (S. Ruth ed. 1980).
30. I find support for my articulation of the perceptive self in lawyering in the
writings by J. KATZ, supra note 4. He explores the ways by which physicians can more
consciously employ the human skills to develop a more mature and mutually responsi-
ble doctor-patient relationship. He points out that the occurrence of professional con-
versations that yield mutually satisfactory results are in fact rare. He admonishes, "[W]e
have spared no effort [at technical progress] but have paid little attention to learning
how to better communicate with one another." Id. at XIV.
Yet it is this level of skill that he finds deeply affects the quality of the doctor-
patient relationship. Katz says that trust must be forged in a joint effort to disclose what
is known and what is unknown, warning that blind trust by the client is dangerous.
Furthermore, he also emphasizes that the more one does not understand one's self, the
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perience and external surrounding circumstances; to separate percep-
tion or observation from the processes of interpretation and judgment;
and to create and change the frameworks within which interpretation
and judgment take place.31
We use these skills when testing understanding in communication,
such as an interview or any exchange in any work task.32 For instance,
greater the impediment to achieving actual understanding with one's client. Specifically,
among the points he advocates are self awareness and expanding the concept of pro-
fessional responsibility in doctoring to include behavior for interacting with the under-
standing of others. These are all principles that I include in my framework. I find the
existence of Katz's work supportive of my theory because there is much which the
two professional relationships have in common. The danger of blind trust by the client
is certainly one such commonality.
Robert Burt explains how both physicians and lawyers suppress acknowledgment
of mistrust by the people they service in the professional relationship. Both professions
expect obedience and trust. Instead, Burt believes that trust must be earned by the
practitioner in every encounter. Burt posits that trust will occur in the individual relation-
ship when the legal profession adopts rules of professional conduct which mandate
attention to this issue. Burt, supra note 23, at 1046.
The need to cultivate reflective abilities in using the intrapersonal skills in lawyering
in order to uncover and not distort the client's wishes is given serious examination in
Lehman's influential article The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, supra note 4. There has
been some prior comment in legal literature recognizing that a focus on human skills
should be included in the law school curriculum in a meaningful way. See Barkai, supra
note 4; Griswold, supra note 4; Riskin, supra note 23. See also Watson, On Teaching
Lawyers Professionalism: A Continuing Psychiatric Analysis, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE
LAW STUDENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 139 (1973); Redmount, The Transac-
tional Emphasis in Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1974); Sarat, supra note 4;
Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971).
31. In lawyering, much of what the lawyer does is to learn by means of solving
problems. She then extends that understanding in some fashion in the external world.
This is an integral part of my theory which is also supported by C. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL
TYPES (1923); I. MYERS, GIFTS DIFFERING (1980); C. ROGERS, supra note 18. This literature
focuses upon the development of the self and the existence of different personality
types based upon different modes for perceiving information, for making judgments or
decisions on information, and for dealing with the outside world.
32. Carl Rogers developed a model of the human as capable of learning about self
through thoughtful nonjudgmental reflection of thoughts and behaviors. He developed
a framework for the types of communication skills that are necessary in order to com-
prehend and examine the reality of others. His contribution to my theory is in the
exploration of the intrapersonal tasks required of the listener in achieving this dynamic
for the interpersonal skills of active listening. His writings dealt with the training of the
professional in performing these functions. See C. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 331-33.
Many of the purposes for such skills are similar to the needs of a lawyer in conducting
fact investigation and in comprehending the scope of the issues to be addressed. The
lawyer uses these skills in order to execute many discrete lawyering tasks. Again, how-
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Ebenezer might have said to Smith: "You appear to be looking for
something else in my responses. Please tell me what that is so that I
may respond to your real concerns." The skills of the perceptive self
are also used to judge one's observation of data. For example, Ebene-
zer asks Smith: "You seem to be disappointed with Harris's perform-
ance?" We also use the perceptive self to identify the lawyer's reac-
tions to circumstances and to understand them in a proper context.
Thus, Ebenezer might use his perceptive self to identify his own reac-
tions to Smith's feelings about the deposition. For instance, Ebenezer
would ask himself, "Why am I annoyed at Smith's insistence on seeing
Harris's performance at the deposition as unsatisfactory?"
Awareness of the perceptive self in legal tasks permits the possibil-
ity of embracing the idea that decision-making in law practice is not
entirely centered upon a rational method. 33 Equally important to lawy-
ever, the lawyer is likely not to be self aware of the existence nor quality of her usage
of these skills. Nevertheless this self awareness is acquirable. Therefore, I transport the
need of self awareness in the exercise of these skills into lawyering by defining the
range of professional activity to explicitly include such behavior. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE,
supra note 4, at 20-37, for a fine job of exploring the particular skills of active listening
in client interviews. Such skills are an important part of the human skills associated with
the perceptive self in lawyering.
33. Howard Gardner's work is particularly supportive of my theory that we use
different forms of knowledge in making communication and behavioral choices. H.
GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND (1983). His theory is that there is not one general form of
intelligence that is responsible for thought in the mind. This is a radical departure from
the Binet concept of Intelligence Quotient which is now deeply imbedded in our cul-
ture and which recognizes solely the mathematical, logical intelligence as rational
thought. In the early 1900s, Binet developed his theory by observing what was useful
behavior for learning in the classroom and thus that context governed the creation of
his theory on intelligence. Gardner, Beyond the IQ: Education and Human Develop-
ment, 57 HARV. EDUC. REV. 187 (1987). Gardner defines intelligence as "the ability to
solve problems or to fashion products that are valued in one or more cultural settings."
Id. at 189. Gardner studied different human groups including brain impaired people and
surveyed data on different human and animal samples. He found that there were at
least seven distinct intelligences in the brain and that all were equally important to the
functioning of the human mind. These seven included the two already accepted as the
definition of intelligence: logical-mathematical and spatial which account for abstract
thought, precision, logical structure, keen observation, visual thinking, mental images
and metaphor. The additional intelligences he identified are: linguistic, musical, kines-
thetic, interpersonal and intrapersonal.
It is particularly the last two intelligences which complement my theory. Interper-
sonal intelligence is the set of skills associated with the abilities to understand others.
Intrapersonal intelligence is the set of skills associated with self-knowledge and the use
of one's values, purposes, and feelings in the use of the self. Id. at 190. I not only
recognize the importance of the existence of these forms of intelligence in lawyering, I
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ering, awareness of the functioning of the perceptive self permits con-
scious use of such nonreactive skills as withholding judgment or under-
standing the other's perspective. Each of these skills are crucial for
lawyers to practice if they are to refrain from making nonreflective
judgements. 34 Awareness of the perceptive self permits the attorney to
take advantage consciously of intuition, inventiveness, and inclination. 35
These skills also permit client-centered lawyering.36
"The knowing self" is a label for those skills, functions or mental
processes which are openly accepted as the core of lawyering skills. 37
These are the processes or skills we use to evaluate a situation deliber-
ately or to reach a decision. This, of course, includes the small evalua-
tions, decisions, and value judgments that may occur just beyond the
realm of our conscious mind. For instance, when Ebenezer judges that
attending to Smith's needs is not within the scope of his role, he is
applying a rule, norm, standard or value in coming to a conclusion or in
taking a specific course of action. The abilities in reasoning inductively
and deductively are present in the knowing self. For instance, Ebene-
also include them as capable of being consciously learned and practiced.
One scholar has taken issue with the widely held belief that logical thinking alone
leads to good moral judgments. Carol Gilligan does acknowledge the role of the inter-
personal dimension in reaching moral judgments. This observation stands apart from
discussing her main thesis and her critics' responses. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
34. Self awareness and ability in some of the human skills associated with percep-
tive self have been acknowledged by other disciplines as having profound impact upon
the delivery of professional service. D. Schbn addresses the crises in confidence exper-
ienced by all professions and the challenge to become reflective in practice. He de-
votes special attention to how the professional can learn to be reflective in the process
of doing professional tasks, thus increasing the likelihood of individual satisfaction for
the practitioner and effective service for the client. See D. SCHON, supra note 4. In
addition, John Forrester stresses that the tasks of the professional urban planner are
often "deeply social" and require the practitioner to keenly reflect on one's own inter-
actions with clients and others. He focuses upon the critical importance of adequately
understanding others and of possessing "critical listening.skills." _. FORRESTER, PLANNING
IN THE FACE OF POWER ch. 7 (1989).
35. See J. ADAMS, CONCEPTUAL BLOCK-BUSTING (3rd ed. 1986) (full exploration of the
development of non-linear thinking which produces creative problem solving or inven-
tiveness). Understanding the epistemology of intuition and inclination is beyond the
scope of this article.
36. See supra note 20. Much of the literature assumes or implies the effective
presence of the perceptive self in the lawyer.
37. See Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L J. 875 (1985). This
article focuses on learning objectives in clinical legal education. It articulates, albeit with
a different schema, the particular skills associated with the knowing self.
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zer's efforts to interpret logically the impact of Harris's actions upon
Smith imply certain premises. This aspect of ourself, the knowing self,
also involves the skills of planning and modifying our actions intention-
ally. Typically, it is only the knowing self which is credited for our ability
to distill legal issues in live cases, apply the appropriate doctrine, and
function technically in the methods of formal legal discourse.38
I articulate below the component skills which are exercised within
the knowing self and within the perceptive self. This listing is not in-
tended to be exhaustive. Rather, this listing should be viewed as a pre-
liminary effort to identify what we value and devalue in the work of a
lawyer even though all aspects may have great bearing on the-success
of our efforts.39 Obviously, no such division of two different selves ex-
ists within the attorney. In reality, these skills or functions exist together
and not in separate spheres or domains. Thus, I identify the perceptive
self and the knowing self as artificial categorizations within the whole
set of human skills possessed by the attorney. In actuality, the individual
lawyer's abilities to effectively interact with others and engage in prob-
lem-solving requires the interactive usage of the entire set of human
skills. These two listings are provided in order to concretize the theory
of this article to specific functions we all perform.40
38. See supra note 23.
39. See supra notes 20 & 37.
40. Theories regarding intelligence, the "holographic" brain, and the "triune" brain
are compatible with my formulation of the perceptive and the knowing selves in lawy-
ering, each as a package of complementary skills which are not divided along the lines
of cognitive versus affective, will versus reason, rational versus irrational, intuitive versus
analytical and left-brain versus right-brain. Admittedly, there are several different char-
acteristics attributable to left-brain and right-brain functions and the two hemispheres
do process information differently. Sperry, Lateral Specialization in the Surgically Sepa-
rated Hemispheres, in THE NEURO-SCIENCES THIRD STUDY PROGRAM 5 (F. Schmitt, F. Worden,
& G. Adelman ed. 1974). Nevertheless, both hemispheres share in many mental
processes, and "higher" mental functions such as synthesis are not attributable to either
hemisphere alone. Hand, The Brain and Accelerative Learning, 1 PER LINGUAM 6 (1986).
Although there are studies indicating which mental process or activity is associated
with one particular brain hemisphere, there is research indicating that many functions
can occur by using either hemisphere. Springer, Educating the Two Sides of the Brain,
__ AM. EDUC. 34 (1989). See also S. SPRINGER & G. DEUTSCH, LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN (1985).
The variety of different mental functions and the associations of used and unused
mental processes which can be tapped in more conscious ways is a premise useful to
support my theory that human skills can be leaned and developed. The theory of the
holographic brain is compatible with my theory in that it models the brain as a complex
network of neurological interactions in the brain as a whole. This theory sees the many
different centers of brain activity as transportable and highly interactive. H. GARDNER, THE
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IV. THE AWARE USE OF THE KNOWING SELF
The skills of the knowing self are those skills we value in our lawy-
ering work. These are the skills associated with legal analysis and the
use of logical paradigms to reach judgments and take action. Further,
these same skills are employed to evaluate prior actions and to modify
a pending legal task or anticipate a future legal task. The following list
articulates the component human skills that are part of the knowing
self.41
1. The ability to evaluate one's own behavioral choices by apply-
ing norms to specific actions. - For instance, this is Ebenezer's ability to
examine consciously whether his original statements to Smith were ap-
propriate given Ebenezer's intention of effectively addressing Smith's
concerns.
2. The ability to evaluate one's own choices in internal mental
judgments by applying norms or standards to specific judgments. - For
instance, this is Ebenezer's conscious ability to judge the appropriate-
ness of his private judgment that Smith is incapable of handling his own
affairs in light of the standards Ebenezer uses to judge mismanagement.
In other words, Ebenezer applies norms to perceive Smith's misunder-
standing of the deposition's purpose and Smith's overreaction to Har-
ris's performance in the deposition. .
3. The ability to identify one's assumptions or conclusions con-
currently or consecutively with one's actions. - For instance, this is Ebe-
nezer's ability to tune into his mental judgments of Smith's character
during his decision or after his decision to ignore any further complaints
by Smith about Harris's performance.
4. The ability to test one's assumptions or conclusions concur-
MIND'S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION (1985). In perceptual research,
Dr. Paul MacLean developed the model of the triune brain as a schema for achieving
the full human potential in any task. MacLean, On the Evolution of Three Mentalities, in
2 NEW DIMENSIONS IN PSYCHIATRY: A WORLD REVIEW 305 (S. Arieti & G. Chranowski ed.
1977). Useful here is Dr MacLean's assertion that to function completely in creative
tasks, one must join those parts of the brain responsible for intellectual activity with
those parts responsible for feeling and emotion. This synergy supports my assertion
that both knowing and perceptive functions are intermingled in conscious activity, they
are knowable, and they can be used to enrich each other when one is aware of the
mixture. It goes without saying that the two can work against each other when we are
blind to their co-existence.
41. The illustrations provided are brief because there should be no difficulty for
the reader in specifically applying the abstract process to concrete examples in one's
work. See supra note 37.
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rently or consecutively with one's actions. - For instance, this is Ebene-
zer's ability to evaluate whether his judgment of Smith's character is
appropriate during his decision or after his decision to ignore any fur-
ther complaints by Smith about Harris's performance.
5. The ability to summarize or expand content. - Expanding con-
tent is the ability to develop detail on a given point. For instance, this is
Ebenezer's ability to articulate specifically and to develop from Smith
some textured specificity or content as to any one of Smith's general
concerns.
6. Deliberate planning for the undertaking of specific actions to
achieve goals or objectives. - For instance, this is Ebenezer's ability to
plan his strategy and tactics for the Harris deposition in light of his over-
all litigation strategy for the case.
7. Modifying or changing the range of one's response as an
aware outcome after reflection. - For instance, this is Ebenezer's ability
to alter his attention in this case to include the well-being of his client's
employment relations with Harris if Ebenezer concludes such a shift is
warranted after evaluating what issues with Smith warrant his attention.
8. Inductive and deductive reasoning (cause and effect). - For in-
stance, this is Ebenezer's ability to articulate the premises; grounds or
principles which justify his finding in this case that total liability should
be contested or for finding that certain specific facts are relevant to a
judicial decision to protect the corporate entity. This reasoning would
include Ebenezer's articulation of the law and facts which support his
legal theories.
9. The ability to structure comparisons for analogy and distinction
which includes the ability to categorize and organize data. - This ability
is, in actuality, many distinct skills. For example, Ebenezer has first
sorted and organized the facts and law of this case, and then has sub-
sequently compared it with other such cases in order to assess the via-
bility of plaintiff's cause of action. Armed with this analysis, Ebenezer
plans his defense strategy, which includes his approach to the Harris
deposition.
V. THE AWARE USE OF THE PERCEPTIVE SELF
The skills of the perceptive self are those skills we do not value in
our lawyering work. These are the skills associated with nonjudgmental
listening and expressing; the ability to monitor internal bias; attending
skills for accurate understanding of others; and the ability to see pat-
terns from analogy and from shifts in examining particularities to exam-
ining generalities. Because these skills are less obvious to the reader, I
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provide more thorough explanation and illustration to aid
comprehension.
1. The ability to use nonjudgmental listening and expressing
skills.- Both listening and expressing are stated jointly because often
the attorney may internally comprehend accurately the information
communicated, but is unable to express that understanding without
judging it or being perceived to have judged it. The former requires the
ability to play back accurately what one is perceiving. The latter further
requires the ability to identify misperception and then to clarify the
matter for the other person. The misperception may be that of the
lawyer or the other person. Precision and accuracy are required in the
active expressing skills. It is often ineffective to express content in
vague or general terms.
Illustration: Suppose Smith had just expressed anger at Ebenezer for
his defense of Harris's deposition. A judgmental response by Ebe-
nezer would be: "Don't get defensive. I am simply stating my ob-
servations of the matter." A nonjudgmental response would be:
"You appear angry and disappointed by my remarks."
2. The ability to use attending skills. - Attending skills are the abili-
ties to invite further understanding of the content which the attorney
has understood by active listening and expressing. Illustration: Using the
example above, a nonattending response by Ebenezer would be: "You
appear angry and disappointed by my remarks." An attending response
would be: "You appear angry and disappointed by my remarks. What
about them upsets you so?"
3. The ability to monitor internal bias and reaction.- I use the
term "monitor" as the label for the ability to identify consciously one's
biases or prejudices and then control one's behavioral responses.
Illustration: Ebenezer is hearing the remarks from Smith directed at
him. Overall, because of Smith's reactions to Harris, Ebenezer has
concluded that his client is domineering and selfish. As a result, Ebe-
nezer quietly decides to spend as little time interacting with his cli-
ent as possible. The absence of use of these monitoring skills leaves
Ebenezer open to raw reaction. That is to say, he is making behav-
ioral choices in reaction to these prejudices in less than a deliberate
manner. Ebenezer is making judgments about his client as a result
of his bias against Smith's overt emotionality. These judgments in-
fluence Ebenezer's behavioral choices.
A response indicative of the use of these monitoring skills
would be three-fold. First, Ebenezer is able to hear inside himself,
and understand that he is affixing these labels to his client. Second,
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Ebenezer would reflect upon his basis for such judgment and the
ways in which Ebenezer might discuss these reactions with Smith.
Third, Ebenezer would consciously attempt to compensate for or
put aside these reactions when examining the necessity for interac-
tion with his client.
4. The ability to understand accurately another from the other's
perspective.- This particular ability encompasses the three abilities
above and further includes an ability to test whether the understanding
one has achieved through active listening and *expressing, attending,
and monitoring bias or prejudice is the one intended to be conveyed
by the other person. For example, an attorney may leave an interview
or any interaction satisfied of her understanding due to her good exer-
cise of the previous skills. The other person (client, witness or col-
league) may have a different view of how well she or he is understood.
Understanding the other's perspective includes understanding that the
individual may have underlying concerns which have not been ex-
pressed. Such understanding is necessary for an accurate understanding
of the other person's circumstances.
Illustration: Ebenezer and Smith had all the previous exchanges us-
ing the skills of the perceptive self. What follows is an example of
what may occur when not testing whether the other person has
been understood. Ebenezer has learned from this interaction much
more about Smith's reactions to the Harris deposition. Ebenezer
thinks he now understands "where his client is coming from" and
leaves it at that. After all, Ebenezer certainly took good care of his
client by effectively listening and expressing, attending, and moni-
toring his own reactions. Ebenezer assumes, as a result of his good
work, his client is now in a different and better posture about the
matter.
In fact, the client has changed, but is far from being in a differ-
ent spot regarding his pending and future actions. Smith has re-
sponded to all of Ebenezer's inquiries candidly and perhaps exper-
iences some discomfort at this level of candor, but expects to hear
some understanding of his position from Ebenezer as a result of this
discussion. Since Ebenezer is silent, Smith concludes that Ebenezer
was trying to explore Smith's concerns, but assumes that Ebenezer
understands the situation no differently than before since Ebenezer
had nothing to say about the matter in the end. As a result, Smith
decides never to let himself have another conversation like this
with Ebenezer. He should have known better; lawyers never really
understand what their clients are experiencing, but only some ab-
straction of the client's life experience. Smith, having discussed Har-
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ris, is once again quite (but quietly) agitated about Harris.
Assume instead that Ebenezer elected also to inquire whether
Smith concludes he is understood. After exercising all the previous
skills of the perceptive self, Ebenezer now states: "Let me summa-
rize what you have been telling me for a moment before we pro-
ceed. I want to see whether I have heard you correctly. Essentially,
you have expressed dissatisfaction with both me and Harris regard-
ing the handling of the deposition. More particularly, you have
commented that . . ." Here Ebenezer briefly restates what he has
understood from Smith. Ebenezer concludes this section by asking
Smith: "Do I understand what you have been saying?" Smith re-
sponds mostly yes, but not on one important point. Smith then dis-
closes that he has been terribly affected by the change in Harris's
behavior. He has experienced great disappointment over a business
relationship seventeen years in the making and really cannot under-
stand why Harris did what he did. Ebenezer is now in a position to
make some different choices regarding the direction of the conver-
sation with Smith.
5. The ability to see shifts in examining particularities to examining
generalities.- This particular skill refers to creative thought, which is the
ability to see larger contexts, patterns and frameworks.42 Such ability
permits a different assessment of the communication because it is delib-
erately being reviewed for different contexts which might alter the law-
yer's understanding of the information.
Within this skill, there is also the ability to respond to intuition and
examine the situation in light of that shift. Mapping or clustering is an
intentional activity to look at a particular area, but in undirected and
nonsequential fashion. Rather, once the issue or topic is identified, the
individual permits the mind to make its associations in any way it flows.
This substance is not automatically harnessed into a structure or order
because that organization can easily occur later. Therefore, if you visu-
alize this activity, you would see your written random thoughts in vari-
ous spaces on the yellow pad and appearing as distinct clusters of
thought. Ebenezer might write in the center of the page the core con-
cern, such as Smith's dissatisfaction with the deposition, and then com-
mence to write several different thoughts randomly elsewhere on the
42. Creative thought is viewed as a consequence of a mixture of processes as
well as attitudes. See P. KLINE, supra note 10; MacLean, supra note 40. See also Greene-
baum, How Professionals (Including Legal Educators) Treat Their Clients, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
554, 564 (1987) (discussion of the skill of searching. Searching is analogous to this abil-
ity). Greenebaum views searching as the skill which law students need to give extra
attention. See id.
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page relating to this concern. This flow of diverse thoughts may allow
for the capture of insights and new perspectives. Ebenezer should be
able to look at Smith's reactions and brainstorm several different con-
texts for the understanding of Smith's reactions. This brainstorming in-
cludes the ability to construct different hypothetical connections within
or among such categories or concepts.
Illustration: Ebenezer might formulate the following as the pos-
sible contexts for Smith's statements or behaviors: Smith's reactions
relate to the particulars of the legal representation; to current issues
with Harris; to historical issues with Harris; or to his business con-
cerns. Quickly scanning these possibilities, Ebenezer may or may
not come up with the most likely context for understanding Smith's
concerns. Intuition may voice some indication as to the proper or
most likely contexts in which to place Smith's issues. By considering
the different contexts, Ebenezer is able to identify different criteria
for judging the situation. Ebenezer, therefore, may have the oppor-
tunity to inform his choice of responses by considering all the con-
texts. Ebenezer may determine that some contexts overlap in cer-
tain ways. Thus, Ebenezer may still view the matter, for instance, as
a current reaction to the behavior of Harris. However, pondering
the different contexts may soften the boundaries of that judgment
so that Ebenezer is able to consider that Smith may have been in-
fluenced by the other considerations mentioned. Ebenezer may
then have more choices in how to respond to or limit the role of
Smith's concern in going forward with the case.
VI. WORKING WITH OTHERS
"Working with others" is an alternative frame of reference that
expands the scope of observable behavior in lawyering.43 Effective
lawyering requires a competent level of self-awareness and social inter-
action if the reach of an attorney's professional activity is extended to
43. See supra notes 4, 9, 14, 15, 20, 21 & 30. There is a client centered model of
practice which is value free or neutral and in which the lawyer is not self aware. See
Bastress, supra note 20. Client centeredness does not explicitly integrate the full range
of human skills that I suggest, nor give emphasis to the effect of these skills on the
lawyer's values and thoughts. By extension, the potential consequences to the client
and others are overlooked. I bring a perceptive self skills focus to client centeredness
which I label, "working with others." J. Elkins proposes that lawyers adopt an ethics of
searching, questioning, and reflecting regarding ethical choice. I propose such reflection
on the quality of the lawyer's interactions in human relationships. Elkins, Ethics: Profes-
sionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 KY. L.J. 937 (1984).
1990]
The Journal of the Legal Profession
her behavior when "working with others." 44 From this perspective, law
practice requires the meshing rather than the separation of human in-
teraction and legal tasks. In other words, the boundaries between sub-
stantive legal tasks and the processes of human interaction are not
fixed. Because their respective contents are often commingled, paying
attention to the quality of human interaction is often not a diversion
from the necessary attention to the quality of the substance of legal
tasks.45 Effectively "working with others" requires the pragmatic lawyer
to cultivate her ability to use the nonadversarial communication skills
which I identified earlier as associated with the perceptive self. A pre-
condition to the effective practice of these skills is self awareness in the
use of these skills.
Expanding the range of behavior deemed part of a lawyer's pro-
fessional conduct to include "working with others" originates from my
view that all lawyering has an essential public purpose.46 Although the
attorney and the client may enter into a private contractual relationship
for the provision of legal services, this service is distinct from all other
private professional services in that it is by this relationship that the cli-
ent interfaces with the norms of her government in being part of the
social order.47 The lawyer is the transmitter of these norms and to
some degree represents the authority of the legal system. In addition,
through the use of lawyers, vast segments of the public gain access to
government for determination of rights, duties, and obligations in soci-
ety and to society. Even for the large numbers of our population finan-
cially unable to retain legal assistance, their rights and-duties are often
affected by lawyers with the responsibility to carry out public tasks. For
instance, an unrepresented person may face a prosecutor, judge or
other public official acting in one of a variety of different roles such as
an agency attorney or an administrative hearing officer.
44. The work of N. BRILL, WORKING WITH PEOPLE: THE HELPING PROCESS (1973) is support-
ive of my frame of reference. She focused on self awareness and abilities in many of
the skills associated with the perceptive self as necessary conditions for the construc-
tion of an effective helping relationship. Although her background is that of a social
worker, her context is that of any person working with people. Many of the tasks of
such a helping relationship overlap with that of the attorney-client relationship.
45. See Barkai, supra note 4; Mudd, supra note 9.
46. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 WIS. L. REV. 30. Robert Gordon asserts that the loss of the tradition of public
service in lawyering impairs the lawyers' awareness of their duties to both clients and
the public at large. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 BUL. REV. 1 (1988).
47. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 A. B. F. RES. J. 613.
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The quality of the nonadversarial communication, collaboration,
and problem-solving skills used by the perceptive self in any of these
public roles is as important as the substance of the activity because
both affect the outcome. In the client's perception, this is usually an
outcome representing the authority of the social and legal order in
resolving the client's case. This authority is perceived by the client as
dictating the actual outcome no matter whether the outcome is negoti-
ated, litigated or adjudicated. The actions of attorneys affect a lay per-
son's opinion and understanding of her government. Lay persons re-
spond not only to the substance of their issues but also to the human
interaction of their lawyers as well. It necessarily follows that lawyers,
as public actors, should be seriously concerned about the quality of
their behaviors in human interaction.
Ebenezer is faced with legal tasks which intertwine human interac-
tion with the execution of legal tasks in Clark v. Smith. Ebenezer has
faced the complexity of this reality in his client contact and his prepara-
tion during discovery. This intermixture of human interaction and ra-
tional analysis is not, however, confined to the areas of interview'ing,
counseling, negotiating, mediating or witness preparation, but is also
present in the reality of conducting direct and cross-examination, oral
argument, supervising staff and peer collaboration. Not only would the
quality of Ebenezer's fact investigation with Smith be different when
paying attention to the perceptive self, but also would be Ebenezer's
ability to formulate and test different legal hypotheses or theories. This
is because Ebenezer's attention has been broadened to examining the
underlying issues in the different selves. Ebenezer's understanding of
the facts of the dispute should also be broadened and deepened as a
result. Ebenezer's use of these skills will give him a better understanding
of the case and improved communications with the others involved'
Adopting "working with others" as an area belonging to the law-
yer's professional conduct has the potential for empowering both the
attorney and client.48 The attorney should be less confused about con-
tent and the client's objectives, and the client more able to appreciate
what is happening. The attorney using the perceptive self in "working
with others" will be assisting the client in making choices rather than
mindlessly exercising authority in the social dynamic with the client at
the expense of the client. Still, the client will seek guidance from the
48. Of course attorneys may decide not to embrace the values associated with"working with others," but nevertheless improve their lawyering by paying attention to
both the perceptive and knowing selves.
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lawyer. The reality of the lawyer's social authority and technical exper-
tise will still influence client decision making at both conscious and un-
conscious levels. There can be, however, a shift in the lawyer's behav-
ior which increases the likelihood of mutual understanding, more
effective counseling, and informed active choice.
The expansion of professional conduct to include "working with
others" paradoxically leaves many attorneys feeling vulnerable to the
needs of the client. Assuming an equal level of authority with the client,
rather than a superior level of authority, exposes attorneys to a more
equal human dynamic in which they are expected to be responsive to
the the actual needs and concerns of the client. Although this level of
interaction should yield more accurate identification of the client's
wishes, attorneys may translate this challenge as requiring the attorney
to resolve all of the client's problems. Such a course of action is neither
desirable nor appropriate. Rather, the attorney should achieve a fuller
understanding of the client's viewpoint and actual circumstances which
should inform her decision making with and on behalf of the client.49
"Working with others" requires that attorneys should not solely
control the agendas of substance and process. Attention to one's be-
havior in interaction with others assists the lawyer in controlling the de-
gree to which she is unconsciously influencing or altering the decisions
for the client.50 Because "working with others" is a client-centered ap-
proach to practice, the client has greater opportunity to become edu-
cated in the particularities of the case. If one takes the time to develop
a deeper understanding of the client which is communicated to the
client, and if the attorney uses that understanding to fashion resolution
processes, in actuality the client has a greater chance of becoming an
active participant in the life of her case because she experiences herself
as fully understood and her circumstances as respected. Thus, the at-
torney who uses the perceptive self in "working with others" increases
the possibilities for empowered client involvement. The limitations of
empowered client involvement then become more a question of the
client's ability to assume responsibility for learning problem-solving skills
in jointly exploring her concerns with her attorney.
Thus, "working with others" promotes a focus which can include
an examination of the values that underlie one's choices analytically and
49. D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974).
50. Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, supra note 4. See also T. SHAFFER, ON
BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981); G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 4; Shaffer,
The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); Shaffer,
Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721 (1975).
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behaviorally. Values influence and are part of the rational thinking pro-
cess and they influence the processes used by the perceptive self. Even
when explicit values are excluded from intellectual analysis, hidden val-
ues influence the framework, framing of issues, and evaluation in the
analytical process. Such inquiry into underlying values is useful for the
client in gaining clarity regarding her views of the transaction or dispute.
Such inquiry of the lawyer's viewpoint by the lawyer herself is also
useful to her because she may uncover the fact that she is operating
with bias and unquestioned subjectivity in her analytical process.
VII. CORE RATIONALIZATIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE PERPETUAL RESISTANCE
This section examines existing core rationalizations within the legal
profession which account for much of the resistance to focusing upon
the use of the perceptive self in "working with others" in lawyering.
Core rationalizations are the hidden, generalized, and unquestioned jus-
tifications used as support for a position or perspective.5 These
thought patterns become imbedded in our thinking over a period of
time and function to maintain the status quo in favor of a position or
perspective.52 In this section, core rationalizations are identified, catego-
rized, briefly examined for their theoretical premises and discussed in
light of this article's framework.
The study of our legal culture's core rationalizations about self
awareness and human skills assists lawyers in exploring their own
boundaries as to what behavior they include within their concept of
the "professional conduct" of lawyers. Contemplating core rationaliza-
tions helps us to integrate consciously human skills into the practice of
law because these rationalizations disclose the ways in which lawyers
resist attention to the practice of human skills. My objective is to articu-
late the theoretical perspective which supports the rationalization be-
cause it is that perspective with its inherent values which is responsible
for many of our professional choices, actions, and behaviors.
These core rationalizations are so deeply embedded that some are
51. I selected the term "core rationalization" rather than the term "perception" in
describing this type of thought. Although these statements are bedrock views which
commonly affect lawyers' actions, these statements are forms of empirical observation.
This is not to say that there are not deeper or truer motives behind these statements.
Rather, my "underlying premises" serve as the hidden and perhaps unconscious foun-
dation from which these rationalizations spring.
52. See W. LEHMAN, How WE MAKE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 45-65. In Lehman's
examination of the self in lawyering, he is quick to point out that we hide our real
reasons in decision making behind rationalizations.
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implicitly rather than overtly expressed. These are rationalizations that I
regularly encounter both verbally and behaviorally among lawyers and
law students.' 3 Although, in the past, legal authors have acknowledged
some of these core rationalizations, few of them have been examined
seriously.54
I have developed five major underlying premises as a result of my
focus on common themes. They are:
1. Adversarial outlook and/or behavior in problem solving ac-
tivity generally produces the desired results.
2. The individual attorney bears minimal responsibility for the
quality of human interaction in lawyering.
3. The lawyering process is not fundamentally affected by the
quality of human interaction.
4. Human skills are specialized knowledge external to the study
and acquisition of lawyering skills.
5. Personality style and preference are private matters of the
self and are therefore not matters meriting attention in professional
development.
6. Conclusion.
The following is a discussion of the above-stated premises:
1. Adversarial outlook and/or behavior in problem solving activity
generally produces the desired results for client and for society. - I
doubt that many of us will disavow adherence to this premise stated as
starkly as it is. However, this unstated belief nurtures the first two core
rationalizations which are described below. Because these two rational-
izations appeal to what is familiar as well as to what may be proper in a
given situation, it is easy to neglect their contribution to our resistance
to the use of the human skills associated with the perceptive self when"working with others" in lawyering.
a. Core Rationalization- "Advocacy and rigorous dialogue re-
53. I have distilled thirteen core rationalizations which explain the perpetual resis-
tance to paying attention to the perceptive self in working with others that
predominate among lawyers. Although there may be many more that I have not identi-
fied, these thirteen gave me the basis for examining their theoretical content. I catego-
rized these rationalizations into like groups and then I searched for the common theme
or premise within each group. Each group is, however, not exclusive of the others. A
rationalization may have elements of more than one of these themes. I distilled what
was the principle theme for me in these rationalizations in order to provide organiza-
tion for this inquiry into our professional attitudes towards human skills in lawyering.
54. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 47. See also D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (serious examination of rationalizations in a philosophical context of
dominant and alternative professional visions).
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quire adversarial behavior and point/counter-point argument." - This
implicit belief is deeply held among many colleagues in the legal profes-
sion because it tightly captures an important perspective in legal the-
ory.55 This rationalization has an absolutist character which justifies pri-
mary reliance on positional dialogue without regard to circumstance.
Social policy analysis is given only narrow room for critique within a
perspective devoted to judicial decision and precedent as the method
for preserving order and for responding to pressures for social change.
This theoretical approach is therefore understandably applied in form-
ing the adversarial method of intellectual dialogue which, in fact, has
become the very hallmark of Anglo-American judicial and legal decision
making. As a result, this behavior is often presumptively regarded as
the principal effective form of thinking in problem solving in all legal
functions. Notice that this core rationalization eliminates the opportu-
nity to engage in creative thinking because it denies the value of brain-
storming and nonlinear thinking.
b. Core Rationalization- "Adhering to principle requires adver-
sarial dialogue." Often adversarial dialogue is justified by assuming that
such a form of discussion is appropriate because the interaction is one
where the participants are adhering to their particular principles. That is
to say that out of respect for their respective principles, participants
engage in adversarial dialogue. This form of interaction is part of the
means by which we publicly show respect for our principles. Correla-
tively, this is also taken to mean that if one does not engage in adver-
sarial dialogue on an issue of principle, then such a participant is engag-
ing in the dialogue without adherence to a principle at issue.
Furthermore, it is often assumed that there is a difference of principle
when actually it is misperception or misinformation that is at issue and
not a difference in values.
The rationalization that adherence to principle requires adversarial
dialogue reflects a blending of different perspectives. One perspective
is captured by the bold, unsupported and unquestioned assertion that
this method of dialogue achieves the validation of principle. The contri-
bution to this thinking by another approach to legal theory is more
subtle. The assertion of an unquestioned link between clarification of
principle and adversarial dialogue is fashioned as an objective statement
of fact, and passes as a mere description of present conditions. This
55. For examples of this rationalization operating in legal jurisprudence, see Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. 1073 (1984); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1979).
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approach further discourages questioning that would expose and ex-
plore alternative modes for clarifying principle because it parades this
rationalization as being value-free.
2. The attorney has minimal responsibility for the quality of
human interaction in lawyering.- When taken to this level of abstrac-
tion, very few lawyers would align themselves rhetorically with this atti-
tude. However, this attitude is deeply set within our professional be-
havior and our expressed opinions which deny the role of human skills
and the participation of the perceptive self when working with others
in lawyering.56 Although some of these rationalizations are acknowl-
edged, we continue to be faced with the challenge of transforming
within ourselves behavior relating to human interaction as a component
of professional conduct.
a. Core Rationalization-"My opinions in general, and about the
issues of this paper in particular, have very little to do with how I law-
yer."-This rationalization contains the premise that the lawyer's atti-
tudes do not affect how the lawyer interprets the law nor how the
lawyer chooses behavior in conducting legal activity. In essence, this
rationalization disembodies law from its human and social origins, which
by their very nature, contain subjective historical experience. This same
perspective views the correct interpretation of law as limited to the
actual language of the law. By eliminating historical context, economic
and social facts, judges limit the scope of their decisions to literal appli-
cation which permits unreviewable hidden personal discretion in inter-
pretation. Under this view, judges are admonished that they are barred
from interpreting law as a product of social history and are instructed
not to adjudicate in ways which seek to reconcile law to present
conditions.
b. Core Rationalization-"It is not my responsibility if I am misin-
terpreted or if I misinterpret the other. This is not my problem." The
lawyer's actual understanding of the client's communications and the
verifying of the client's understanding of the lawyer's communications
are areas of practice which receive little instruction in law school and
little supervision in practice. These abilities require consistent self-
awareness and reflection. The professional obligation of the lawyer to
acquire self-knowledge regarding her abilities as a lawyer to work with
others is yet to become a seriously discussed legal premise. Although
56. "The professional codes both reflect and reinforce an attitude, common
among attorneys, that conflict with clients should be denied, rather than acknowledged
and explored." Burt, supra note 23, at 1015.
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there is an emerging trend in legal education which addresses the need
for broader problem solving skills in lawyering tasks, attention to the
development of the perceptive self is uncommon. In other words, the
abilities to reflect upon one's behavior, to examine the effects of one's
behavior on others, and to explore the perspectives of others nonjudg-
mentally receive serious attention neither in the education of lawyers
nor from organized legal professional associations. Even lawyers who
extol the need for clarity in communication are frequently unaware of
the complexity of the processes that generate misinterpretation.
c. Core Rationalization- "The client can get another lawyer if
she/he doesn't like my style, which has nothing to do with how good a
lawyer I am."5- 7 This statement is uttered frequently. In essence, it trivial-
izes the quality of the human skills by characterizing them as a matter
of individual "style." The public purpose of lawyering is dismissed by
this perspective. If there are public functions associated with the role of
lawyer then one would favor a higher standard of behavior because
the lawyer's acts are public acts with public consequences. This is not
simply a private matter involving the client's individual preferences. Less
apparent, this rationalization embodies many different rationales. First,
this statement reflects a belief in the existence of unspoken, unverifi-
able values which give inherent definition to lawyering as excluding the
competent practice of human skills associated with the perceptive self.
Secondly, these values are regarded as so globally acknowledged that
there is no need for proof or explicit support. Thirdly, this theory of
lawyering assumes the existence of only one correct perspective on
the particular interaction, that of the lawyer. Choices in communication
and behavior are separated from the individual's practice of law. This
rationalization embodies the view that ideas alone constitute the whole
substance of the matter. Ideas are not viewed, in whole or in part, as
57. One makes the assumption in using this rationalization that the client may eas-
ily obtain a lawyer who is self aware in the use of human skills when working with
others in lawyering. This may not reflect reality. Law schools may attract people whose
profile is inadequate in these abilities. Most law schools admissions criteria do not in-
clude the abilities of the perceptive self. Instead, the focus of the admissions process is
generally limited to factors such as grade point averages and LSAT scores. In addition,
law school may exacerbate such inadequacies. See Benjamin, Kaszniak, Sales, &
Shanfield, The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law
Students and Lawyers, 1986 A. B. F. RES. J. 225. Thus, the client may not have a mean-
ingful choice in the matter. See Goodrich, A Problematic Profession, THE NATION, Feb.
12, 1990, at 205; Gutierrez, Counseling Law Students, 64 1. COUNS. & DEV. 130 (1985);
Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 460
(1967).
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the product of social interaction.
3. The lawyering process is not fundamentally affected by the
quality of human interaction. - This premise is superficially less distaste-
ful than the foregoing premises for many lawyers. This is because juris-
prudence has developed in such a way as to buttress legal structures
which boldly uphold the truth of this premise.5 8 This premise goes to
the heart of the predominant historical definition of the lawyer's profes-
sional role. The view that substantive expertise far overshadows other
concerns is key to this premise. The emphasis on substance explains
why we often encounter, either in words or deeds, the following core
rationalizations among lawyers regarding the expansion of professional
conduct to include the aware use of perceptive self in working with
others.
a. Core Rationalization - "I am an expert. These concerns do
not affect my lawyering." -Here again, the lawyer is acknowledging
the gap between the meaning of legal rules and the actual manipuula-
tion of the legal system by human forces. The professional obigation is
so narrowly drawn that a function which does not directly lead to the
intellectual clarification of law or its application is deemed beyond the
lawyering role. One way to justify this narrow classification is to rele-
gate human skills to the exclusive professional domain -of disciplines
other than law. In addition, it is often stated as an objective fact that
many of these skills cannot be competently performed in ordinary law
practice. It is further claimed that these same skills come into play only
for the rare, and horrendously difficult human interactions which aforti-
ori require the attention of other disciplines. Again, the human skills as-
sociated with the perceptive self are neglected as central to law prac-
tice and are excluded from the range of skills defined as within the
lawyer's expertise. This attitude is easily demonstrated by the regular
placement of ordinary human behavior which we encounter in our
work such as anger, confusion, misinterpretation, misperception and
sadness into the category of rare, and horrendously difficult human in-
teractions which the lawyer is not competent to handle.
b. Core Rationalization - "I am just like a brain surgeon. Lawyer-
ing requires technical know-how and not bed side manner." - Again,
this rationalization is the product of a particular lawyering perspective.
The emphasis in this statement is on the nature of lawyering. Lawyering
is conceived as the technical manipulation of legal rules enforced by
58. For a discussion of this jurisprudence, see Brennan, supra note 9; Wald, Disem-
bodied Voices - An Appellate Judge's Response, 66 TEX. L. REV. 623 (1988).
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state power. The human element is stripped away from law practice in
order to abstract and then isolate the legal issues for treatment. Those
who hold this perspective understand the function of law as separate
from the course of human events. By focusing on the mechanical, literal
tools of analysis utilized in the interpretation of law, the articulation of
legal rules occurs without any contextual analysis. Thus, the practitioner
is viewed as the technician in a process unaffected by the technician's
lack of effective human skills.
c. Core Rationalization- "These concerns have nothing to do
with the substance of law." This belief denies the relational quality of
meaning of any law to experience. In other words, this belief denies
the role of one's social experience in influencing one's interpretation of
law and surrounding matters. Simplistically, I remind the reader that al-
though we may view conditions similarly, we view them differently in
that our views can never entirely overlap. However, the isolation of
substance reflects a specific approach to understanding law and soci-
ety. In essence, this statement expresses the belief that the realities in
the application of law to a client's circumstances do not fundamentally
affect the interpretation of the law itself. This view separates the orga-
nizational analysis of the raw sovereign law from its surrounding reali-
ties and thereby denies the interwoven existence of both the norm and
its connection to life's experience. Within this perspective it would logi-
cally follow that human behavior, including one's own behavior, does
not affect how one interprets or applies legal rules.
4. Human skills are specialized knowledge external to the study
and acquisition of lawyering skills.- Historically, this premise has been
greatly influential in the development of the legal profession because it
has been assumed by lawyers that professional competency in human
skills requires an intensive level of psychoanalytic or psychodynamic
process. This view is often articulated in reaction to the view that law-
yers should become aware of the role that human skills associated with
the perceptive self play in their work. In other words, the use of human
skills has been viewed as specialized technical expertise appropriate to
a different profession, rather than the basic skills in communication and
self awareness associated with healthy interaction, which are easily in--
corporated into our own professional skills development. This theme,
therefore, creates resistance because lawyers are socialized to believe
that this broader definition of professional conduct sets standards for
lawyers which only those who have practiced or undergone extensive
psychotherapy could achieve.
In the alternative, there also exists a strong premise which is inde-
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pendently relied upon in support of this rationalization. Many col-
leagues assert that the levels of human skills I am addressing should
independently exist in the individual as a product of the ordinary devel-
opment from childhood to adulthood. This assumption bears little re-
semblance to reality. The human skills associated with the perceptive
self and which contribute to reflection, self-concept, self-esteem, and
critical self-examination are not the typical focus within our educational
systems. Nor is there widespread consistent attention to these areas
among family units. The differences in family experience is vast and ex-
tends beyond differences in education, class, and race. Whether human
skills are characterized as the specialized knowledge of a different pro-
fession, or alternatively as a natural by-product of human development,
these skills are treated as unteachable and not learnable in a curriculum
devoted to lawyering. In contrast, the levels of sensitivity and integra-
tion of skills I advocate are the ones generally associated with basic
problem solving activity and basic effective communication skills. Nev-
ertheless, this premise continues to spawn a plethora of core rational-
izations of which the following are examples.
a. Core Rationalization - "I agree that these concerns are impor-
tant in lawyering but none of us have the luxury of having the time
needed to focus on these issues."-This rationalization oddly appears
to blend two contradictory approaches to legal thought. First, it is as-
sumed that the lawyer's principle work, by and large, excludes the
practice of human skills or that the lawyer's principle work mostly in-
cludes the technical analysis of legal rules which is significantly unaf-
fected by social interaction. Nevertheless, embedded in this rationaliza-
tion, there is the awareness that human interaction influences the
practice of law. However, it is also perceived that this influence cannot
be appropriately addressed by the practitioner because time must be
devoted to the tasks of technical legal analysis and formal legal dis-
course. In actuality, the attorney's pragmatism stops short of seeing that
if the quality of human interaction were seriously addressed in lawyer-
ing tasks the practitioner might become more efficient.
b. Core rationalization - "Human skills are generally too subtle for
scrutiny and thus I am not sufficiently competent to pay attention to
them in my practice." -Subtlety suggests that we are dealing with fine
distinctions in communication and behavior which are difficult to ana-
lyze. Ordinarily just the opposite occurs; the behavior and communica-
tion affected by the skills of the perceptive self are readily apparent
once the individual identifies such issues as relevant to his or her prac-
tice. The underlying concern in finding this material elusive is the belief
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that experience itself is a matter which is not subject to serious intellec-
-tual inquiry. This underlying belief has also been responsible in part for
the resistance to fully embracing the value of clinical legal education.
c. Core Rationalization- "The necessary professional level of
human skills associated with the perceptive self will be acquired ade-
quately by the law student in his or her future practice after law
school."-This rationalization justifies the lack of attention to the skills
of the perceptive self in legal education and clinical supervision. Several
underlying beliefs fuel this rationalization. Here, the matter is summarily
addressed by stating that such lessons will naturally occur in the future
professional experience of the student.59 Those who express this view
assume that the skills associated with the perceptive self in lawyering
will develop naturally as a product of undirected work which is never
supervised with attention to this agenda. Conversely, it is assumed that
attention will be given to this agenda in future professional work. Either
way, this perspective overlooks the potential injury to clients and
others by the lack of any conscious use by the new lawyer of the skills
associated with the perceptive self.
Prioritizing the objectives in legal education so as to reduce the
significance of teaching human skills in the curriculum directly justifies
the limited distribution of educational resources to this matter. Teaching
these skills may be simply defined as external to the law school's re-
sponsibilities in educating lawyers.
5. Personality, style and preference are private matters of the self
and are therefore not matters meriting attention in professional
development.
a. Core Rationalization-" am the way I am. You cannot teach
an old dog new tricks. Take it or leave it (take me or leave me)." -
This rationalization is similar to, but different from, the rationalization
which treats the issues as a matter of style and client choice in repre-
sentation.0 There, the emphasis was on the nature of the lawyer's role.
Here the emphasis is on the nature of the self. Here, the self is viewed
as a separate and distinct concept from the use of the self in profes-
sional service.
It is an understandable human reaction in encountering an un-
known challenge and electing either through fear or preference not to
59. There is a possible alternative assumption at play here. This is the premise that
students come to law school having already adequately learned these skills. There are,
of course, many sub-premises behind this belief, including assumptions about society,
family and prior education. See supra pp. 279-281.
60. See supra Core Rationalization 2c, p. 277.
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accept the challenge. Here, the lawyer silently admits the gap between
the pronounced legal rules and the actualities of a legal system affected
by a host of social pressures. However, the limits of this admission are
quite narrow in that it does not compel incorporation of this concern
into how the attorney functions as part of the legal system. Nor would
the lawyer here advocate that the concern for the competent practice
of human skills associated with the perceptive self be placed within the
domain of jurisprudential concerns.
b. Core Rationalization- "Human skills are personal attributes (a
matter of personality) which cannot be taught or learned." - This
statement rests on organic theory which posits that the individual is in-
herently functional or deficient in the use of these abilities. This rational-
ization is based on the premise that human skills are part of the organic
personality and are not learned by the individual. This belief assumes
the pre-existence of these abilities in individuals and also assumes a cer-
tain level of ability in these skills. Professional training in these skills is
either regarded as redundant or they are not viewed as amenable to
professional instruction.
Because exploration of the individual's beliefs, values and assump-
tions in the decision making process is a part of acquiring human skills,
and because this inquiry is regarded as fundamentally private, such in-
quiry is viewed as inappropriate in law school instruction and in any
legal work environment.61 In this rationalization, self-awareness in the
exercise of these abilities associated with the perceptive self is regarded
as belonging to the private domain of the individual. Particular choices
in communication and behavior are viewed as personal choices of the
professional when lawyering.
6. Conclusion.- As the above survey demonstrates, we have in-
sulated ourselves from growth as responsive, effective problem solvers
and communicators by our uncritical adherence to many core rational-
izations which justify our choices in behavior and communications
when lawyering. I hope this closer look at the underlying premises, as-
sumptions and values provides the reflective lawyer with the opportu-
nity to reconsider those choices in future behavior. Perhaps then, the
reflective lawyer may choose to further develop her abilities to use the
human skills of the perceptive self in lawyering and to place greater
emphasis on her working with others. Perhaps this reflection also will
61. The acquisition of human skills involves the exploration of one's values, beliefs
and assumptions. See J. HIMMELSTEIN, HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW (Monograph Iil, 1982);
Himmelstein & Lesnick, supra note 21.
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encourage revision of the lawyering curriculum in law schools to in-
clude instruction in these neglected human skills which affect the quality
of both traditional and nontraditional lawyering tasks.

